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1. Introduction 
 
Joseph Schumpeter’s contribution to our understanding of the basic mechanisms of 
technological progress and economic development is widely recognized. In The Theory 
of Economic Development he emphasizes the role of the entrepreneur as prime cause 
of economic development. He describes how the innovating entrepreneur challenges 
incumbent firms by introducing new inventions that make current technologies and 
products obsolete. This process of creative destruction is the main characteristic of, what 
has been called, the Schumpeter Mark I regime. In Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy, Schumpeter focuses on innovative activities by large and established firms. 
He describes how large firms outperform their smaller counterparts in the innovation and 
appropriation process through a strong positive feedback loop from innovation to 
increased R&D activities. This process of creative accumulation is the main 
characteristic of, what has been called, the Schumpeter Mark II regime1. 
 
The extent to which either of the two Schumpeterian technological regimes prevails in a 
certain period and industry varies. It may depend upon the nature of knowledge required 
to innovate, the opportunities of appropriability, the degree of scale (dis)economies, the 
institutional environment, the importance of absorptive capacity, demand variety, etc. 
Industries in a Schumpeter Mark II regime are likely to develop a more concentrated 
market structure in contrast to industries in a Schumpeter Mark I regime where small 
firms will continue to proliferate. 
 
Most of the 20th century can be described as a period of accumulation. From the 
Second Industrial Revolution through to the 1970s the large firm share was on the rise in 
most industries and the economy as a whole. It was the period of ‘scale and scope’ 
(Chandler (1990)). It was the era of the hierarchical industrial firm growing progressively 
larger through exploiting economies of scale and scope in areas like production, 
distribution, marketing and R&D. The conglomerate merger wave of the late 1960s 
seemed to have set the case. The period seems to be aptly described by the 
Schumpeter Mark II regime. However, from the 1970s onwards times have changed. 
There is ample evidence that the share of small businesses in manufacturing in Western 
economies has started to rise (Acs and Audretsch, 1993 and Thurik, 1999). Large firms 
have been downsizing and restructuring in order to concentrate on ‘core business’ 
again. In the meantime the entrepreneur has risen from the dead. High-technology 
innovative small firms have come at the forefront of technological development in many 
(new) industries. Piore and Sabel (1984) claim that an ‘industrial divide’ has taken place. 
Jensen (1993, p.835) considers it the period of the Third Industrial Revolution. The last 
quarter of the 20th century may therefore be described as a period of creative 
destruction in the sense of the Schumpeter Mark I regime. 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 For a summary of the Schumpeter Mark I and Mark II regimes also see Soete and ter Weel (1999). 
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In the present paper we investigate why this change happened and what its 
consequences have been for economic progress. We develop a model relating the 
regime switch to economic development and present empirical evidence. In Section 2 
we present a variety of theoretical considerations. It is followed by Section 3 in which we 
present our two-equation model. The first equation explains the change in the business 
ownership rate while the second equation explains economic growth. The notion of an 
equilibrium business ownership rate, being a function of economic development, will be 
crucial in the analysis. In Section 4 we present the data of 23 OECD countries and in 
Section 5 we present the estimation results. The final section is used for discussion. 
 
2. Theory 
 
In this section we will discuss the Schumpeterian regime switch. We discuss the pre-
1970s era of declining self-employment rates and the period thereafter in which the rates 
appear to rise again in most Western economies. Next we discuss how the business 
ownership rate at the economy-wide level can be used to determine the extent of 
structural transformation. The interrelationship between the extent of business 
ownership and economic growth is dealt with. 
The first three quarters of the 20th century can be characterized as a period of declining 
small firm presence in most industries. In many Western countries and industries this 
decline has stopped and even reversed. Many old and large firms have been losing 
ground to their small and new counterparts since. We label this as a regime switch from 
Schumpeter Mark II to Schumpeter Mark I. We note that the regime labels are rough 
approximations as the industrial landscape shows a far too great variety to claim that in 
each and every industry one of the Schumpeter regimes is prevailing. A further 
complication is that business ownership and entrepreneurship are not synonymous for at 
least two reasons (see also Amit et al. 1993).  
 
First, business owners serve many roles and functions. Many researchers distinguish 
between Schumpeterian (or real) entrepreneurs and managerial business owners 
(Wennekers and Thurik 1999). Entrepreneurs are a small fraction of the business 
owners. They own and direct independent firms that are innovative and "creatively 
destroy" existing market structures. After realizing their goals Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs often develop into managerial business owners, but some may again start 
new ventures. Managerial business owners dominate in the large majority of small firms. 
They include many franchisees, shopkeepers and people in professional occupations. 
They belong to what Kirchhoff (1996) calls “the economic core”. Occasionally, 
entrepreneurial ventures grow out of them. In an empirical context it is difficult to 
discriminate between managerial business owners and entrepreneurs. For that profiles 
of individual business owners would be required. Moreover, the discrimination is a 
theoretical one since most business owners are neither pure "Schumpeterians" nor pure 
"shopkeepers" but share the attitudes associated with these extremes in a varying 
degree. Second, entrepreneurial energy is not limited to self-employed individuals. Large 
companies promote 'intrapreneurship' within business units to achieve more flexibility 
and innovativeness (Stopford and Baden-Fuller 1994). 
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Despite these conceptual problems we argue that the secular trend of the business 
ownership rate declining and afterwards starting to rise again for many countries 
presents a fair indication of the general development of the level of entrepreneurship, at 
least in modern economies. It shows how the extent of (real) entrepreneurship which 
tended to decline during the accumulation era was followed by a rise in the creative 
destruction period from the 1970s onwards.  
 
The impact of economic development on business ownership 
 
The proportion of the labor force that is self-employed has decreased in most Western 
countries until the mid-1970s. Since then the self-employment rate has started to rise 
again in several of these economies. Blau (1987) observes that the proportions of both 
male and female self-employed in the nonagricultural U.S. labor force declined during 
most of this century. He also observes that this decline bottomed out in the early 1970s 
and started to rise until at least 1982. The data used in the present paper show that the 
business ownership rate in the U.S. has continued to rise in the 1980s while stabilizing 
in the 1990s. More recently business ownership increased in several other countries as 
well. We will first discuss the period of decline of business ownership (Mark II regime) 
followed by a discussion of the period of reversal of this trend (Mark I regime). 
 
Decline of business ownership 
 
Several authors (Kuznets, 1971; Schultz, 1990; Yamada, 1996) have reported a 
negative relationship between economic development and the business ownership (self-
employment) rate. Their studies use a large cross-section of countries with a wide 
variety in the stage of economic development.  
 
There are a series of reasons for the decline of self-employment, and of small business 
presence in general. Lucas (1978) shows how rising real wages may raise the 
opportunity cost of self-employment relative to the return. Given an underlying 
“managerial” talent distribution this induces marginal entrepreneurs (in this context 
Lucas refers to managers) to become employees. This pushes up the average size of 
firms. Schaffner (1993) takes a different approach. She points out that “over the course 
of economic development the advantages firm owners derive from being less risk averse 
(better diversified) than self-employed producers are likely to rise relative to the 
disadvantages caused by the costliness of circumventing asymmetric information 
problems.”(p.435). Iyigun and Owen (1998) develop a model implying that economic 
development is associated with a decline in the number of entrepreneurs relative to the 
total number of employees. They argue that fewer individuals are willing to risk 
becoming an entrepreneur as the “safe” professional earnings rise with economic 
development.  
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Chandler (1990) stresses the importance of investment in production, distribution, and 
management needed to exploit economies of scale and scope during the period after the 
second industrial revolution of the second half of the 19th century. It was a period of 
relatively well-defined technological trajectories, of stable demand and of seemingly 
clear advantages of diversification.2 
 
Reversal of the trend 
 
Several authors have provided evidence of a reversal of the trend towards less self-
employment. Acs et al. (1994) report that of 23 OECD-countries, 15 experienced an 
increase in the self-employment rate during the 1970s and 1980s. They show that the 
weighted average of the self-employment rate in OECD-countries rose slightly from 
8.4% in 1978 to 8.9% in 1987. Closely related to the development of the self-
employment rate is the development of small business presence in general. Some of the 
other sources showing that the growing importance of large business has come to a halt 
in Western countries include Carlsson (1989), Loveman and Sengenberger (1991), Acs 
and Audretsch (1993), Acs (1996) and Thurik (1999).3  
 
There are several reasons for the revival of small business and self-employment in 
Western economies. First, the last 25 years of the 20th century may be seen as a period 
of creative destruction. Piore and Sabel (1984) use the term Industrial Divide, Jensen 
(1993) prefers the term Third Industrial Revolution, while Freeman and Perez (1988) talk 
about the transition from the fourth to the fifth Kondratiev wave. Audretsch and Thurik 
(1997 and 2000) stress the effects of globalization and the information revolution leading 
to the demise of the comparative advantage of Europe in many of the traditional 
industries, such as machine tools, metalworking, textiles and automobile production. The 
most obvious evidence is the emergence of new industries like the software and 
biotechnology industries. Small firms play an important role in these new industries. Acs 
and Audretsch (1987) provide empirical evidence that small firms have a relative 
innovative advantage over their larger counterparts in such highly innovative industries. 
Evidence for the comparative advantage of small firms in inventing radically new 
products is also given in Prusa and Schmitz (1991), and Rothwell (1983, 1984). 
 
Second, new technologies have reduced the importance of scale economies in many 
sectors. Small technology-based firms started to challenge large companies that still had 
every confidence in mass production techniques (Carlsson 1989). Meredith (1987) 
argues that small firms are just as well, or better, equipped to implement technological 
advances and predicts the factory of the future to be a small factory. Jensen argues that 
“It is far less valuable for people to be in the same geographical location to work 
together effectively, and this is encouraging smaller, more efficient, entrepreneurial 
organizing units that cooperate through technology” (Jensen 1993, p. 842). This is 
supported by Jovanovic claiming that: “recent advances in information technology have 
                                                           
2 Audretsch and Thurik (1997) characterize this period as one where stability, continuity and homogeneity were the 
cornerstones and label it the managed economy. 
3 See also the various editions of The European Observatory for SMEs  that provide an account of state of small 
business in Europe, for instance EIM (1997). 
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made market-based coordination cheaper relative to internal coordination and have 
partially caused the recent decline in firm size and diversification” (Jovanovic 1993, p. 
221). Others, like Rothwell (1983, 1984), stress that large and small firms complement 
and succeed each other in the innovation and diffusion process. See also Nooteboom 
(1994) for an account of the concept of ‘dynamic complementarity’ 
 
Third, deregulation and privatization movements have swept the world. In countries like 
Australia, Finland, Italy and Sweden there have been strong tendencies to deregulate 
and privatise (OECD 1995, p. 39-49). Phillips (1985) reports that small firms have 
dominated in both the creation of new businesses and new jobs in deregulated industry 
sectors in the U.S. in the early 1980s. This confirms some preliminary empirical 
evidence as provided by Shepherd (1982). Governments have also begun to 
acknowledge and promote the vital role of small (start-up) firms in achieving economic 
growth and development. See Storey and Tether (1998), OECD (1998) and EIM (1994 
and 1996). 
 
Fourth, there has been a tendency of large firms to concentrate on ‘core competences’ 
(Carlsson 1989). Jovanovic (1993) reports that the 1980s were characterized by 
corporate spin-offs and divestment. Aiginger and Tichy (1991) blame much of the ‘back-
to-basics’ and downsizing (or rightsizing) tendencies on the opportunistic conglomerate 
merger wave of the late 1960s. 
 
Fifth, the increasing incomes and wealth have enabled individuals to strive for ‘higher’ 
needs. As a result the demand for variety increases (Jackson 1984). Cross-cultural 
influences have also enlarged the demand for variety. Small firms are often the most 
obvious suppliers of new and specialized products. The decrease in diversification as 
reported by Jovanovic (1993) suggests that large firms have not been capable of 
entering into such market niches. 
 
Sixth, self-employment is more highly valued as an occupational choice than before. 
Roughly one out of four young U.S. workers pursue self-employment according to 
Schiller and Crewson (1997). Kirchhoff (1996) argues that self-employment is not 
anymore characterized as under-employment or being mom-and-pop establishments, 
but as a way to achieve a variety of personal goals. Also, as hypothesized in social 
psychology there is a Maslowian hierarchy of human motivations, with physical needs at 
the bottom and self-realization at the top (Maslow 1970). A higher level of prosperity will 
induce a higher need for self-realization and thereby may stimulate entrepreneurship.4 
 
Finally, the employment share of the services sector has been well documented (Inman, 
1985) to increase with per capita income. Given the relatively small average firm size of 
most services (barring airlines, shipping and some business services) this creates more 
opportunities for business ownership. 
 
                                                           
4 Entrepreneurial energy as such may not suffice for economic progress. Baumol (1990) stressed the importance of 
entrepreneurship being led into productive channels. 
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Obviously, some of these factors may have had a temporary effect only. For example, it 
is not unlikely for the outsourcing and deregulation waves to dry up. On the other hand, 
there are more permanent effects like the impact of new technologies. We refer again to 
Freeman and Perez (1988). They claim that in the new techno-economic paradigm (fifth 
Kondratiev wave) the organization of firms will be ‘networks’ of large and small firms. 
See also Oughton and Whittam (1997) who emphasize the role of external economies of 
scale when explaining the viability of small firms. Moreover, the introduction of these 
new technologies is also positively related to the stage of economic development 
through necessary skills and other investments. This structural influence of economic 
development is reinforced through the increasing variety of demand for specialized 
goods and services and the enhanced valuation of self-realization which are also 
dependent on the attained level of prosperity. 
 
An equilibrium rate of business ownership 
 
In the present paper the economy-wide rates of business ownership in relation to the 
level of economic development (per capita income) are used to discriminate between 
Schumpeterian regimes. We also investigate whether countries that deviate strongly 
from the “average” business ownership rate for comparable levels of economic 
development suffer in terms of economic growth. For this we develop an error-correction 
model to determine the “equilibrium” rate of business ownership as a function of GDP 
per capita. The notion of “equilibrium” appears more akin to neo-classical economic 
theory than to a Schumpeterian framework. In the next paragraph we discuss some neo-
classical approaches to this issue. However, in our empirical application the “equilibrium” 
rate of business ownership reflects no more than a rate to which the respective rates in 
the countries have tended to adjust to. It lacks precision. This is in accordance with 
Simon (1991, p. 41-42): “organization size and degree of integration, and the boundaries 
between organizations and markets, are determined by rather subtle forces. The wide 
range of organizational arrangements observable in the world suggests that the 
equilibrium between these two alternatives may often be almost neutral, with the level 
highly contingent on a system’s history”. 
 
Equilibrium rates of self-employment in the neo-classical framework can be derived by 
making assumptions about (1) the aggregate production function combining the efforts 
of business owners and wage-employed individuals and (2) their rational occupational 
choice between self- and wage-employment. Differences in the assumptions about 
which factors influence the choice for self-employment lead to different equilibrium 
models. Two early contributions are Lucas (1978) and Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). 
Lucas assumes individuals to have different managerial abilities while Kihlstrom and 
Laffont assume individuals to differ with respect to their risk attitudes. Calvo and Wellisz 
(1980) extend Lucas' model by introducing a learning process through which managers 
acquire the necessary knowledge. These and related models suggest that the stage of 
economic development is the driving force of “equilibrium”. 
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We hypothesize an “equilibrium” relationship between the rate of business ownership 
and per capita income that is U-shaped.5 The U-shaped pattern has the property that 
there is a level of economic development with a "minimum" business ownership rate. 
Many forces may cause the actual number of business owners to deviate from the long-
term equilibrium rate. Such a “disequilibium” may result from cultural forces, institutional 
settings (regulation of entry, incentive structures, functioning of the capital market) and 
economic forces (unemployment, profitability of private enterprise). See Kirzner (1997), 
Davis and Henrekson (1999) and Henrekson and Johansson (1999). 
 
There are several forces in market economies that contribute to adapting towards the 
equilibrium. An example may illustrate this point. A high labor income share and a 
structurally low number of enterprises such as many Western economies experienced in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, have undoubtedly contributed to structural 
unemployment. This unemployment has had two consequences. First, unemployment 
has a direct effect on self-employment, as unemployed are more likely to become self-
employed than employees, see for instance Storey (1991) and Evans and Leighton 
(1989).6 Second, structural unemployment gradually results in wage moderation helping 
to restore profitability of private enterprise (lower labor income share). In addition, a 
perceived shortage of business ownership will induce policies fostering 
entrepreneurship, ranging from better access to financing to competition policies. See 
OECD (1998). These equilibrating processes are hard to observe directly and may 
therefore be modeled best using an error correction mechanism. 
 
The effect of business ownership on economic growth 
 
There is some evidence on the relation between size class distributions and economic 
performance. For instance, see Nickell (1996), Nickell et al. (1997) and Lever and 
Nieuwenhuijsen (1999) who present evidence that competition, as measured by 
increased number of competitors, has a positive effect on the rate of total factor 
productivity growth.7 Carree and Thurik (1998, 1999) show that the share of small firms 
in manufacturing industries in European countries has a positive effect on the industry 
                                                           
5 Schultz (1990) reports having found statistical evidence for a quadratic relationship between the share of wage earners and the 
stage of economic development. In Carree et al. (2000) we also investigate an L-shaped pattern in which the equilibrium business 
ownership rate continues to decline with the stage of economic development. There we present some evidence that a U-shape gives 
a better statistical fit than an L-shape. 
6 Alba-Ramirez (1994) shows that for both Spain and the U.S. the duration of unemployment increases the probability of becoming 
self-employed. His analysis suggests that the effect of unemployment duration on the probability of becoming self-employed is not 
very different for the two countries, albeit stronger for the U.S. The results are interesting especially since the Spanish economy has 
a higher degree of unemployment and self-employment when compared to the American economy. The results suggest that the 
influence of unemployment on business ownership is a common feature across economies. Alba-Ramirez also notes that legislation 
aimed to help the jobless starting up their own businesses has been implemented across developed countries and provides the 
example of the Spanish 1985 law giving lump-sum unemployment insurance to workers becoming self-employed.  
7 Acs et al. (1999) point at differences in competition and entrepreneurship when comparing the more successful U.S. 
economy to that of Europe and Japan. 
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output growth. Thurik (1996) reports that the excess growth of small firms8 has had a 
positive influence on percentage change in gross national product for a sample of 16 
European countries in the period 1988 through 1993.9 
 
A theoretical endogenous growth model was developed by Schmitz (1989). His model 
predicts that an increase of the proportion of entrepreneurs in the working force leads to 
an increase in long-run economic growth. See also Holmes and Schmitz (1990) who 
develop a model of entrepreneurship in the spirit of T.W. Schultz. They show how 
specialization in managerial tasks and entrepreneurship – responding to opportunities 
for creating new products and production processes – may affect economic 
development. Finally, some evidence of a well-established historical (long-term) 
relationship between fluctuations in entrepreneurship and the rise and fall of nations has 
been assembled by Wennekers and Thurik (1999). In this respect also the work of 
Eliasson (1995) on economic growth through competitive selection is of relevance. He 
shows (for the Swedish economy) how a lack of industry dynamics affects economic 
progress not so much on the short term but very strongly so on the long term (from 
about two decades on). 
 
Another source of evidence on the relation between self-employment and progress is 
the economic history of the formerly centralized planned economies. A characteristic of 
these economies was the almost complete absence of small firms (and private 
ownership of the means of production), and this extreme monopolization constituted one 
of the major factors leading to the collapse of state socialism (Acs 1996). The 
development of small enterprises is considered a vital part of the current transition 
process in Eastern Europe.10  
 
In the present paper we assume that deviations between the actual and the equilibrium 
rate of business ownership will diminish the growth potential of an economy in the 
medium term. A shortage of business owners will diminish competition with detrimental 
effects for static efficiency and competitiveness of the national economy. It will also 
                                                           
8 The excess growth of small firms in that study is defined as the percentage change in the value-of-shipments 
accounted for by small firms minus that accounted for by large firms. 
9 A subset of small firms which are assumed to improve economic performance are the so-called New Technology-
Based Firms (NTBFs). Many of the businesses can be found on Science Parks of which the number in many countries 
has increased strongly during the 1980s and 1990s. Storey and Tether (1998) show that most of the NTBFs are, in 
fact, small firms. They report the average number of employees to be around 20 both in France and the U.K. The two 
countries were the first in Europe (in 1969) to establish science parks (Cambridge Science Park in the U.K. and 
Sophia Antipolis in France). They claim that Italy serves as an example of lagging behind in the establishment of 
'advanced' science parks and relate this to the relatively low proportion of university research that is financed by the 
Italian private sector. 
10 See for example Russia’s Shatalin Plan, which “is built on the assumption that society needs small enterprises to 
orient production to the needs of every person, to fight the dictatorship of monopolies in consumer and production 
markets, and to create a favourable environment for quick introduction of new scientific and technological ideas” 
(Nolan (1995), p. 82). 
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diminish variety, learning and selection and thereby harm dynamic efficiency 
(innovation). On the other hand, a glut of self-employment will cause the average scale 
of operations to remain below optimum. Moreover, it will result in large numbers of 
marginal entrepreneurs, absorbing capital and human energy that could have been 
allocated more productively elsewhere. 
 
Lyigun and Owen (1998) show in a dynamic model with two types of human capital 
(professional and entrepreneurial) that a misallocation of the existing human capital 
stock between professional and entrepreneurial activities may occur. The nature of the 
inefficiency, however, is not clear-cut. There may be too much entrepreneurship or too 
little, depending on how entrepreneurial and professional skills contribute to the level of 
technology. They find that “a more efficient ratio of professional and entrepreneurial 
skills will raise the steady state of technology, the wages paid to human capital 
providers, and therefore, the economy’s human capital stock” (p. 457). Therefore, their 
model supports our notion that deviations from the level of “optimal” relative 
entrepreneurial activity come at a cost of lower economic performance. 
 
3. Model 
 
The object of this section is to develop a model of the interrelationship between business 
ownership and economic development at the macro level. The model  consists of two 
main equations. The first equation deals with the causes of changes in the rate of 
business ownership whereas the second deals with its consequences. From the first 
equation we derive the equilibrium rate of business ownership as a function of the stage 
of economic development. In the second equation we estimate the effect on economic 
growth of deviating from this equilibrium rate.  
 
The first equation of the model relates the change in the rate of business ownership itE  
in country i in year t to the extent to which this rate deviated from the equilibrium rate *itE , 
to the unemployment rate itU  and the labor income share itLIQ . The second equation of 
the model relates the extent of economic growth to the (absolute) deviation of the actual 
business ownership rate from the equilibrium rate. Economic growth is measured as the 
relative change in the variable itYCAP , the per capita gross domestic product in 
purchasing power parities per U.S. dollar in 1990 prices in country i and period t. We 
correct for catching-up effects by including the level of economic development. The 
equations use the notation 44 −−=∆ ttt XXX . The third equation presents the equation 
relating the equilibrium business ownership rate to the level of economic development. It 
is assumed to be a quadratic function of )YCAPln( it 1+ .11 The model reads as follows: 
 
 
                                                           
11 In Carree et al. (2000) we compare four different specifications of the relationship between the equilibrium business 
ownership rate and GDP per capita.  The log-quadratic specification adopted in the present paper was found to 
outperform the other specifications in terms of goodness of fit. 
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The symbols stand for the following variables:  
 
E:  number of business owners per labor force, 
E*:  equilibrium number of business owners per labor force, 
YCAP: per capita GDP in purchasing power parities per U.S. $ in 1990 prices, 
U:  unemployment rate, 
U :  sample average of unemployment rate, 
LIQ:  labor income share, 
LIQ :  sample average of labor income share, 
ε1, ε2:  disturbance terms in equations (1) and (2), respectively, 
 
Business ownership equation (1) 
 
In equation (1), the variable to be explained is the growth in the number of business 
owners per labor force in a period of four years. The first explanatory variable in the 
equation, which has the parameter b1 assigned to it, is an error correction variable 
describing the difference between the equilibrium and the actual rate of business 
ownership at the start of the period. The parameter b1 is expected to have a positive 
sign. In this version of our model the equilibrium function is U-shaped with respect to per 
capita income (equation (3) has a quadratic form). Because the parabola should first 
drop and then rise (instead of the other way around) we expect the parameter γ  to be 
positive and the parameter β  to be negative. Furthermore, since the relative number of 
business owners cannot be negative or in excess of one, the parameter α  should lie 
between zero and one. 
 
As a second explanatory variable we use lagged unemployment acting as a push factor 
for business ownership12. The expected sign of the parameter b2 is positive. We choose 
a lag of six years instead of four for this variable because mental preparation, practical 
procedures and legal requirements are involved in starting a new enterprise.  
As a third explanatory variable we have the labor income share. This variable is a 
pragmatic proxy for the earning differentials between expected profits of business 
owners and wage earnings. We assume that a relatively high business profitability (as 
compared to wage earnings) acts as a pull factor for business ownership. The labor 
income share is defined as the share of labor income (including the "calculated" 
                                                           
12 Audretsch and Thurik (1998), in an earlier empirical investigation for 23 OECD countries find a positive effect of the 
(lagged) change of unemployment on the change of the self-employment rate. 
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compensation of the self-employed for their labor contribution) in the net national 
income. The expected sign of the parameter b3 is negative. As with the unemployment 
variable, an additional lag has been included. 
 
Economic growth equation (2) 
 
In equation (2), the variable to be explained is economic growth in a four-year period, 
measured as the relative change in gross domestic product per capita. The first 
determinant of growth is the (absolute) deviation of the actual number of self-employed 
(business owners) from the equilibrium rate of business ownership at the start of the 
period. As explained in a previous section, the deviation variable is expected to have a 
negative impact on growth.13  
 
Next to this deviation variable, we take as a control variable into account the level of per 
capita income at the start of the period. It allows us to correct for the convergence 
hypothesis of countries: countries which are lagging behind in economic development 
can grow more easily than other countries because they can profit from modern 
technologies developed in other countries. The expected sign of the parameter c2 is 
negative.  
 
4. Data and estimation technique 
 
We use data material of 23 OECD countries including the fifteen countries of the EU-15, 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and the U.S. and 
for the period 1976 through 199614. Data are made available for the even years only. 
The main data sources are the OECD Labor Force Statistics and the OECD National 
Accounts. In Table 1 some summary statistics values are given for the first and last year 
of the sample and the mid year 1988 (due to lags only the period 1980-1996 will be used 
as the sample period).  
 
From Table 1 we see that Greece, Italy and Spain have the highest levels of self-
employment (business ownership) in 1988: more than 15% of the labor force. The 
unweighted sample average level of self-employment in that year is 10%. The countries 
with the lowest levels of self-employment in 1988 are Austria, Denmark and  Sweden: 
six percent of the labor force. Looking at the GDP per capita in 1988, we see that the 
United States, Switzerland and Luxembourg are the most affluent countries while 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain are the least affluent countries in the sample. The 
unemployment rates are not given in the table but they were highest in the 1980s in 
Ireland and Spain. Low unemployment rates were found in Japan, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Iceland and Luxembourg in that period. 
                                                           
13 In Carree et al. (2000) we consider an alternative penalty function based on the squared instead of the absolute 
deviation. For each of the shapes of the equilibrium function the absolute deviation penalty structure outperformed the 
squared deviation variant. 
 
14 For the unemployment rate and the labor income share we also use data of 1974. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics for the 23 OECD countries  
 
Country  E1976  E1988  E1996  YCAP1988 E*1988 
 
Austria  0.063  0.056  0.062  15,651 0.106 
Belgium   0.098  0.109  0.116  15,326 0.107 
Denmark  0.090  0.062  0.071  16,263 0.106 
Finland  0.061  0.071  0.075  15,456 0.107 
France  0.103  0.098  0.078  16,421 0.106 
Germany (West) 0.067  0.067  0.075  17,245 0.106 
Greece  0.177  0.186  0.196   7,274  0.235 
Ireland  0.090  0.111  0.123   9,735  0.160 
Italy   0.142  0.169  0.183  15,289 0.107 
Luxembourg  0.085  0.068  0.057  21,103 0.119 
The Netherlands 0.092  0.082  0.102  14,867 0.108 
Portugal  0.121  0.145  0.182   8,424  0.193 
Spain   0.140  0.156  0.173  10,886 0.140 
Sweden  0.064  0.064  0.081  16,632 0.106 
United Kingdom 0.076  0.100  0.106  15,590 0.106 
Iceland  0.099  0.101  0.132  17,368 0.107 
Norway  0.093  0.088  0.074  17,301 0.106 
Switzerland  0.073  0.082  0.099  20,133 0.115 
United States 0.088  0.116  0.114  21,543 0.122 
Japan   0.117  0.112  0.089  16,328 0.106 
Canada  0.065  0.079  0.092  18,573 0.109 
Australia  0.110  0.123  0.119  16,154 0.106 
New Zealand 0.115  0.136  0.157  13,532 0.113 
 
Average  0.097  0.104  0.111  15,526 0.122  
 
Note: The business ownership rates E are per labor force. The unit of GDP per capita (YCAP) is purchasing power 
parities per U.S. $ at 1990 prices. In the last column the estimated equilibrium business ownership rates for 1988 are 
given, using the estimates of α , β  and γ  from the ‘Two yearly’ case from Table 2. 
 
Variables and sources 
 
The variable definitions and their main sources are given below. 
 
E : Self-employment or business ownership. This variable is defined as the number 
of business owners (in all sectors excluding the agricultural sector), expressed as a 
fraction of the labor force. Business owners in the present report are defined to include 
owners of enterprises that are not legally incorporated as well as owner/managers of 
incorporated businesses. We use the terms self-employed and business owners 
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interchangeably.15 Data on the number of self-employed (business owners) are from the 
OECD Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994 and 1976-1996. Some data were missing 
however. EIM completed the data by using ratios derived from other variables, which 
sometimes came from other sources. In some countries self-employed are strictly 
defined as individuals owning a business that is not legally incorporated. In other 
countries, owner/managers of an incorporated business who gain profits as well as a 
salary are also considered self-employed. Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain and U.S. use the narrow 
definition, while the other countries apply the broader characterization. For the countries 
not following the broader definition, EIM made an estimation of the number of 
owner/managers by using information derived from statistical bureaus in these countries. 
Another difference in definition is that in some countries unpaid family workers are 
included in the data of self-employed as well. The unpaid family workers were eliminated 
from the data by using ratios derived from other variables, recent years, sometimes 
using data coming from other domestic sources. Data on the labor force are also from 
the OECD Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994 and 1976-1996. Again, some missing data 
have been filled up from other sources.  
 
YCAP: gross domestic product per capita. The underlying variables gross domestic 
product and total population are from OECD, National Accounts 1960-1996, Detailed 
Tables, and from the OECD Labor Force Statistics 1974-1994 and 1976-1996, 
respectively. The GDP is measured in constant prices. Furthermore, purchasing power 
parities are used to make the monetary units comparable between countries. 
 
U : (standardized) unemployment rate. This variable measures the number of 
unemployed as a fraction of the total labor force. The labor force consists of employees, 
self-employed persons, unpaid family workers, people who work in the army and 
unemployed persons. The main source for this variable is OECD Main Economic 
Indicators. Some missing data on the number of unemployed have been filled up with 
help of data from the OECD Labor Force Statistics and the Yearbook of Labor Statistics 
from the International Labor Office.  
 
LIQ : labor income share. The following definition is used. Total compensation of 
employees is multiplied by (total employment/number of employees) to correct for the 
imputed wage income for the self-employed persons. Next, the number obtained is 
divided by total income (compensation of employees plus other income). The data on 
the separate variables are from the OECD, National Accounts 1960-1996, Detailed 
Tables. Some missing data have been filled up with help of data from the OECD Labor 
Force Statistics. 
 
When estimating the model, we weight the observations with population. We think that 
larger countries such as the U.S. and Japan are more important in establishing the 
relationship between business ownership and economic growth than small countries. 
                                                           
15 For more information on various measures of self-employment, see The State of Small Business; a report of the 
president 1996, Washington: US Government Printing Office, chapter 3. 
15 
 
When the data of, for example, Luxembourg or Iceland would call for a different relation, 
we would not want this to have a big impact on the model. We refer to Carree et al. 
(1999, 2000) for a technical description of the weighting of observations. 
 
Special position of Italy 
 
The main problem with estimating the basic model is that there may be (large) countries 
with specific economic circumstances not covered by our model. This could influence the 
estimates towards implausible results. The country we suspect may deviate most from 
the other countries is Italy. Looking at Table 1, we see that Italy combines a high level of 
self-employment with a near average level of per capita income. This is unusual: the 
countries with a high rate of self-employment (business ownership) are generally in a 
less advanced stage of economic development (for example Greece and Spain). Italy 
can be divided in two quite different types of economies: a well-developed economy 
(Northern Italy) and a less developed economy (Southern Italy or the Mezzogiorno). Italy 
might not fit well in our model because it basically consists of two different economies. A 
closer inspection of the data for Northern and Southern Italy16 shows that Northern Italy 
in particular deviates from the expected pattern, i.e., the U-shaped trend of the relative 
number of business owners set out against per capita income. Here, a high self-
employment rate is combined with a relatively high value of the GDP per capita. Small 
and medium-sized firms play a bigger role in (Northern) Italian manufacturing than in 
other industrialized countries. A notable feature of the organization of Italian small and 
medium-sized firm production is its high geographical concentration in small areas or 
industrial districts (Piore and Sabel 1984). The geographical distribution also shows that 
the majority of small and medium-sized manufacturing firms is located in Northern and 
Central Italy (Acs en Audretsch 1993). They often have a strong family component.  
 
The Italian model of extensive small and medium-sized firm production differs from that 
in other countries in similar stages of development. It may have positive and/or negative 
effects on economic growth. Many of the Italian firms are highly specialized and are 
organized on a flexible basis, so as to meet specific customer needs, and produce well 
designed and fashionable goods, aimed at the richest segments of the market. Another 
characteristic of the Italian model, however, is that Italian R&D expenditures as a 
percentage of GNP are by far the lowest among the largest OECD-countries. They 
amount to only half of that in Germany, the U.S. and Japan over a long period (Klomp 
and Pronk 1998, p. 167). Hence, the number of business owners in Northern Italy is 
higher than one would expect on the basis of the advanced stage of economic 
development. The data for Southern Italy seem to be in conformity with the general 
pattern: there is also a high level of self-employment but combined with a low value of 
the GDP per capita.  
 
 
 
 
                                                           
16 Separate data for North- and South-Italy are obtained from the Eurostat Regions Statistical Yearbook. 
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We introduce a dummy variable DITA that is 1 for the Italian observations and 0 
elsewhere. There are several ways to apply this dummy in the model. Specifically, it 
could be placed inside or outside the parabola describing the equilibrium rate of 
business ownership (or both inside and outside the parabola). Clearly, the 
interpretations differ. In Carree et al. (1999) we fail to find evidence that Italy has a 
different equilibrium relation between self-employment and the stage of economic 
development. It appears that Italy has developed an autonomous (additional) rise in the 
number of business owners when compared to other countries. We therefore have the 
error term in equation (1) equal to itITAITAit Da ηε += ,01 .  
 
5. Estimation results 
 
In order to estimate the model (1)-(3) we incorporate equation (3) into equation (1) to 
find: 
 
(4) itt,it,it,it,it,iit )YCAP(lna)YCAPln(aLIQbUbEbaE 14
2
54463624104 11 ε+++++++−=∆ −−−−−  
 
We apply (weighted) least squares to this equation and then find estimates for the 
equilibrium relation parameters through: 
 
(5) 15141320 b/aˆb/aˆb/)LIQbUba(ˆ ==++= γβα . 
 
These coefficients are inserted into equation (3) so that we can calculate the E*-variable. 
This variable is incorporated into equation (2). This equation is then also estimated using 
(weighted) least squares.  
 
We consider two samples. The first is the ‘Two yearly’ case in which data for all the even 
years are used (1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994 and 1996). The total 
number of observations then equals 207. As an alternative we use the ‘Four yearly’ case 
in which data for the years 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 are used. The total 
number of observations then equals 115. The reason for removing observations from the 
sample is that the observation periods for two consecutive even years overlap. This may 
lead to a downward bias in the estimated standard errors of the coefficients. 
 
Weighting with population (in the year t-4) implies that all variables (including constants 
and dummies) are multiplied with the square root of population before the least squares 
procedure is run. In this way, larger countries, in terms of population, are given a larger 
influence in determining the parameter estimates than smaller countries. See Carree et 
al. (1999, 2000) for details of the weighting procedure used. 
The estimation results of model (1)-(5) are in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Estimation results 
 
Parameter Two yearly Four yearly Parameter Two yearly Four yearly 
 
a0   0.200   0.187  α    2.012   1.815 
   (4.1)   (2.7)     (4.4)   (3.0) 
b1   0.096   0.099  β   -1.336  -1.179 
   (4.0)   (2.9)     (4.0)   (2.7) 
b2   0.088   0.084  γ    0.234   0.203 
   (6.3)   (4.2)     (3.9)   (2.5) 
b3  -0.015  -0.015  c0   0.189   0.190 
   (1.1)   (0.8)     (9.7)   (7.8) 
a4  -0.128  -0.117  c1  -0.646  -0.577 
   (3.6)   (2.3)     (3.6)   (2.7) 
a5   0.022   0.020  c2  -0.006  -0.006 
   (3.4)   (2.2)     (5.7)   (4.7) 
a0,ITA   0.010   0.010 
   (4.4)   (3.0) 
 
2
1R    0.325   0.283  
2
2R    0.537   0.599  
 
N   207   115  N   207   115 
 
Note: Absolute t-values between brackets. 
 
As can be seen from Table 2, all parameter estimates, except for that of b3, are 
significant. Notably, we indeed find evidence for the hypothesized U-shape of the 
equilibrium rate of business ownership. The estimated parameters α , β  and γ  are 
significantly different from zero. Also, β  and γ  have the predicted signs. We find that α  
is in excess of unity, in contrast to our expectations. This is likely to be a consequence of 
concentrating on relatively rich countries instead of including data from less developed 
countries as well. Further investigation of the parabola shows that for the ‘Two yearly’ 
case the minimum value is reached for a level of per capita income of 16,373 U.S. dollar 
(in purchasing power parities) at 1990 prices. The minimum level of equilibrium business 
ownership is 10.6% of the labor force. In Figure 1 we show the equilibrium curve and the 
actual data for the G7-countries. For the ‘Four yearly’ case the value of the minimum is 
0.105 and it is attained at a level of 17,175 U.S. dollar. We will concentrate on the 
results of the ‘Two yearly’ case as they are quite similar to the ‘Four yearly’ one. 
 
The last column of Table 1 presents the equilibrium business ownership rates in the year 
1988. Greece has the highest equilibrium rate, 0.235, in that year. Most of the countries 
are very close to the minimum of the curve, though. The two richest countries, 
Luxembourg and the United States, have an equilibrium rate of 0.12, only about 1.5 
percent points higher than the minimum. For the interpretation of this parabola 
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describing the equilibrium rate of business ownership given a certain stage of economic 
development, it should be noted that the relation is based upon a limited range of values 
of GDP per capita. For values of per capita income far outside our sample range, for 
example less developed countries or GDP per capita levels twice as high as attained in 
the richest countries in our sample, the equilibrium rate of business ownership is not 
properly described by the quadratic function. The high value of α  that we found has to 
be viewed in this context (note that α  corresponds to the value of E* at YCAP=0, see 
(3). 
 
We find that the hypothesized error-correction process of the number of business 
owners towards the equilibrium rate is supported: parameter b1 is significantly positive. 
The speed of adjustment is not high: the deviation from equilibrium at a certain point in 
time decreases with 10 percent in a period of four years. The low value of the speed of 
adjustment is not surprising. The convergence process of the actual business ownership 
rate towards the equilibrium rate is intrinsically slow because it involves structural 
changes of the supply side (setting up enterprises, investments in physical and human 
capital, divestments, etc.). 
 
The parameter b2 points to a positive impact of unemployment on self-employment: 
every percent point rise in the unemployment rate leads to a rise of 0.09 percent point in 
the self-employment rate in the succeeding six years. This is in accordance with earlier 
studies: unemployment is a push factor for self-employment (Evans and Leighton 1989 
and Storey 1991). The other variable explaining the change in self-employment, the 
labor income share, has the expected effect: the parameter b3 is negative. The effect is 
insignificant, though. This means that we fail to find evidence for higher business 
profitability to act as a pull factor for business ownership. The remaining variable in the 
business ownership equation, the Italy-dummy, shows a significant positive parameter: 
in Italy the rate of business ownership rises faster ceteris paribus than in other countries. 
Another important characteristic of the estimation results is the deviation of the actual 
number of business owners from the equilibrium rate having a negative impact on 
economic growth: the parameter c1 is significantly negative. This implies that economies 
with a business ownership rate below the equilibrium may benefit from stimulating new 
start-ups. In case this rate exceeds the equilibrium, it suggests that there are important 
impediments to growth for small and medium-sized enterprises. In the growth equation, 
the per capita income parameter is significantly negative. This might reflect the 
convergence of countries hypothesis. However, it may also be a within (regression-to-
the-mean) effect: a higher value of GDP per capita in a certain year leads to a smaller 
economic growth in the subsequent period. Finally, the constant term c0 is positive.  
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A comparison of the third and sixth column of Table 1 shows that in 1988 most countries 
had too few self-employed relative to the equilibrium value. The most obvious exception 
is Italy.17 It indicates that the high level of self-employment in Italy is not efficient: it has a 
relatively large negative impact on economic growth.18 Countries which had very low 
business ownership rates compared to the equilibrium include the Scandinavian 
countries. These economies are chacterized by a very large public sector, relatively low 
entry and exit rates and high taxes. Eliasson (1995) and Braunerhjelm and Carlsson 
(1999) blame part of Sweden’s relatively bad economic performance in the 1980s on 
limited private initiative and a lack of structural adjustment. 
 
Figure 1: The actual and equilibrium rate of business ownership for G7-countries in 
sample period  
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17 New-Zealand is also an exception. It may be a result of the economic reforms in this country, through which 
business ownership experienced a big boost in the early eighties. See Evans et al. (1996). 
18 In Italy, research and development expenditures are by far the lowest among the largest OECD countries as a percentage of 
gross national product. This is in line with the idea that when there are too many business owners, the scale advantages in research 
and development are not utilized. See Cohen and Klepper (1996). 
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6. Discussion 
 
Business ownership has received considerable attention from policy makers in 
European countries. The high unemployment rate coupled with limited economic growth 
in Europe has triggered a plea by policy makers for rethinking the policy approach that 
fostered prosperity during the post-war era. In two ways globalization has reduced the 
ability of the European countries to generate economic growth and create jobs. On the 
one hand the advent of new competition from low-cost countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe as well as Asia has flooded European markets. On the other hand, the 
telecommunications and computer revolutions have drastically reduced the cost of 
shifting capital and information out of the high-cost locations of Europe and into lower-
cost locations around the globe.  
 
In their efforts to create jobs, politicians turned to promoting labor-intensive and small-
scaled organizations. Furthermore, entrepreneurship, in the form of new firms, and 
intrapreneurship, in the form of new ideas and responsibilities implemented in existing 
organizations, are assumed to be essential to creating new economic activity. In modern 
economies a great variety of organizations is involved in making innovative products. 
This is the case particularly in niche markets like in the ICT sector. The more 
organizations are active in such markets, the greater the chance that an innovation 
takes place. Variety and selection play a dominant role in this mechanism.  
 
It is deeply embedded in the current European policy approach that the creativity, 
autonomy and independence of the self-employed contribute to higher levels of 
economic activity. Therefore, major funds of governmental institutions and independent 
donor organizations are being channeled towards young and small firms. The present 
paper aims at judging whether such policies are justified in different phases of economic 
development. 
 
We adopt a Schumpeterian framework to explain the interrelationship between 
economic progress and the size class structure of firms. We claim that there has been a 
regime switch which caused the hitherto negative “equilibrium” relation between the 
business ownership rate and economic development to become U-shaped. There are 
many other links between entrepreneurship and the macroeconomy. See Acs, Carlsson 
and Karlsson (1999) for a recent and Brock and Evans (1986) for an early survey. The 
present paper zooms in on one specific linkage: that between the number of business 
owners and economic development. Three aspects of this linkage are investigated. First, 
we investigate whether there is a long-term equilibrium relation between the number of 
business owners and the stage of economic development. This conjecture arises from 
analysing empirical and theoretical work in this area. The relation is hypothesized to be 
a decreasing function of economic development in that the self-employment rate is high 
in low-developed economies whereas there is a later phase where mass production and 
scale economies thrive. A vast literature points at a still later phase of economic 
development where the business ownership rate is increasing again. This phase is 
characterized by "the reversal of the trend" towards increasing economies of scale and 
scope. Therefore we formulate the equilibrium business ownership to have a U-shaped 
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relation with respect to economic development. Second, we investigate whether there is 
a correction mechanism when the rate of business ownership is out of equilibrium and 
what the speed of convergence is. Deviations from equilibrium can occur due to 
exogenous shocks and institutional divergences, for instance, because “government 
regulation of market activity is likely to obstruct and frustrate the spontaneous, corrective 
forces of entrepreneurial adjustments” (Kirzner 1997, p. 81). Third, we investigate 
whether deviating from the equilibrium rate of business ownership leads to lower 
economic growth. The three aspects are tested using a two-equation model. The first 
equation explains the growth of the number of business owners using the deviation 
between the actual and the equilibrium rate of business ownership, unemployment as a 
push factor and the labor income share as a measure of business profitability. The 
second equation explains economic growth using the deviation between the actual and 
the equilibrium rate of business ownership, and the per capita income level. The model 
is tested using a data panel of 23 OECD countries.  
 
The rate of business ownership is shown to influence economic growth through 
deviations from the equilibrium rate. This result supports the view that size distribution 
differences across countries matter when explaining economic performance (Davis and 
Henrekson 1999). As a consequence, economies can have both too few or too many 
business owners and that both situations lead to lower growth rates. By and large, a five 
percent point deviation implies a growth loss of three percent over a period of four years. 
In particular, the fact that economic development may be hampered by a number of 
business owners being too high considering an economy's stage of development may 
come as a surprise for European politicians. They see self-employment as a forceful 
weapon when fighting unemployment and stagnating growth. Different stages of 
economic development thus call for different development and stimulation programs.  
 
We find evidence for an error correction mechanism between the actual rate of business 
ownership and the equilibrium rate. Lagged unemployment appears to be a significant 
push factor of business ownership. Italy plays an exceptional role in that there appears 
to be an additional autonomous increase of the rate of self-employment which may have 
frustrated economic growth. 
 
An important policy implication of our exercises is not only that "To induce dynamic 
entrepreneurial competition we require the fulfillment of only one condition: guaranteeing 
free entrepreneurial entry into any market where profit opportunities may be perceived to 
exist" (Kirzner 1997, p.74), but also that exit free of stigma and financial burdens has to 
be safeguarded. See also Acs, Carlsson and Karlsson (1999). Low barriers to entry and 
exit of business owners are a necessary condition for the equilibrium seeking 
mechanisms which are vital in our model of the relation between business ownership 
and economic development. 
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Future research should investigate whether different countries have different equilibrium 
relations depending upon institutional, industrial and other dimensions and how and to 
what extent policy measures are able to influence this equilibrium. Furthermore, while 
the present research is fully based upon country-wide composites, sectoral diversity 
between countries probably plays a role when explaining differences in equilibrium 
situation and differences in the equilibrium restoring mechanism. For that many data 
problems have to be resolved. 
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